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The private costs of electricity supply failures are substantial and inimical to 
industrial productivity. Using results from a small sample survey of manufacturing firms 
in Karachi, the study documented the causes, extent and incidence of the failures, 
identified and classified the firms’ private responses, and estimated the capital share of 
internally produced power and the associated costs. The results are reported here to 
engender discussion for developing a policy model of infrastructure provision suited to a 
developing country like Pakistan. The most encouraging options are those that allow for 
cooperative provision amongst firms with concurrent reforms in the regulatory and 
institutional environments. An optimal policy will allow inter-firm trading of electricity 
making the power market competitive. Those firms that already have extensive private 
generating capacity due to weak public supply will realise scale economies by selling 
electric power to lower the costs of private provision. Competition in electricity supply 
implies that industrial users will find attractive substitutes in the private sector. This will 
lead to a reduction in the demand on public service, already limited in quantity and 
quality in key urban-industrial locations like Karachi. 
  
INTRODUCTION 
Manufacturing firms in Karachi are investing in electricity supply for their 
own use. This is happening because publicly supplied electricity is of poor quality 
and subject to chronic failures. In Pakistan, public electricity provision suffers from 
two kinds of inefficiencies; (a) a non-performing public sector and (b) private 
provision by end users, specifically manufacturing firms. Pasha et al. (1990) 
observed the extensive existence and impact of such inefficiencies. The 
understanding is that private investment in electricity generation absorbs significant 
resources that could be otherwise allocated for efficient industrial production. 
Furthermore, small sized firms sustain the highest burden as they have a lower 
capacity to bear the capital costs of private power generation. 
Nausheen H. Anwar is a Ph.D. candidate, Division of Urban Planning, Columbia University, New 
York, USA. 
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In Karachi several firms in a variety of manufacturing sectors have invested in 
electricity generation. They rely mainly on the publicly available service but 
supplement it with private provision or vice versa. The extent, incidence and costs of 
private substitution vary by industrial sector and by firm size. Notably, the private 
provision of electricity is subject to a high degree of scale economies; the average 
cost per unit of quantity produced falls with increases in the total quantity produced. 
The objective of this paper is threefold. First, it is highlighted how 
deficiencies in electricity supply affect manufacturing firms. Second, it describes 
how firms respond to these deficiencies and estimates the costs of the responses, as 
well as the extent of private costs as a measure of firms’ willingness to pay for a 
reliable service. Third, based on empirical observations, the study offers policy 
options that delineate alternative institutional arrangements for electricity provision 
without advocating an outright replacement of the public sector. It posits that current 
reforms, such as privatisation, necessitate extensive capital outlays and the 
establishment of well-functioning contractual frameworks, currently not present in 
Pakistan. Consequently, there is a need to address the inefficiency problem in a way 
that minimises costs for the industrial sector in the intermediate period. 
The conceptual framework of this discussion is based on recent important 
theoretical and empirical literature [Sclar (2000); Vickers and Yarow (1997); Batten 
(1996); Mody (1996); Pollitt (1995); Clark and Pitelis (1994); Kessides (1993); 
Baumol and Lee (1991)]. The framework emphasises that optimal policies for 
promoting efficiency and equity in infrastructure provision are predicted on fostering 
competition through regulatory and institutional reforms. Such reforms should 
endeavour to create an appropriate public-private balance in infrastructure provision, 
without banishing the public sector from the economic scene. 
 
1.  THE CAUSES OF INEFFICIENCY IN 
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
It is common knowledge that manufacturing firms in Pakistan suffer from 
frequent interruptions in public electricity service forcing most to undertake extra 
investments in generators to avoid production losses and damage to machinery and 
equipment. Although public utilities like WAPDA and KESC have extensive capital 
investment in electric power production, they fail to deliver service at the required 
level of demand. The failures are a result of the low ratio of available capacity to 
installed capacity, extensive transmission and distribution (T&D) losses, and non-
technological or x-inefficiency factors. 
In Karachi power interruptions are due to bottlenecks and congestion on the 
ailing T&D networks as well as x-inefficiency factors concerning institutional 
weaknesses. The survey revealed that in Karachi’s industrial areas, like SITE and 
Korangi, when large energy intensive manufacturing plants start to operate, the 
resulting voltage surge often damages the machinery and equipment of smaller 
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neighbouring firms. Anecdotal evidence suggests that large energy intensive firms 
put a heavier load on the public system and tie up more operable transmission 
capacity. Within the KESC network the congestion is sometimes so severe that the 
system fails completely leading to prolonged power outages in industrial areas. The 
important observation here is that congestion in the use of the system is an additional 
factor that promotes T&D losses. While treating congestion as endogenous is 
common in levying tariffs in infrastructure sectors like transportation, public 
agencies in developing countries like Pakistan have not understood the critical role 
this factor plays in determining optimal pricing policy for electricity service. They 
will have to consider designing specific tariff systems that set a congestion toll 
reducing the load and congestion to a socially optimal level. This will encompass a 
comprehensive study of KESC’s costs and variations in demand by end-user types 
and locations to determine the order of the price that removes congestion. This is 
critical in the short run when deep capital and institutional constraints exist on 
system expansion. 
In the past decades, KESC’s T&D losses have steadily grown to a staggering 
35 percent level, a figure that is extremely high in comparison to other Asian urban 
electric utilities. For instance, the Hong Kong HEC experiences only 12 percent 
T&D losses and Philippines’ MERALCO registers approximately 16 percent. The 
KESC’s T&D losses are due to (i) frequent overloading of old transmission lines and 
distribution feeders, (ii) congestion in the use of the system, and (iii) theft of power 
and unmetered supply that drain energy. Given that Karachi is the economic centre 
of Pakistan, the electricity demand in the KESC supply area has grown 
exponentially. But policy-makers have been negligent inaccurately forecasting 
demand. KESC also lacks the institutional autonomy needed to implement rational 
policy for reforming and expanding the system. Currently, the central government is 
planning to subject utilities like KESC to market discipline through privatisation. 
While this is laudable, there remain critical x-inefficiency factors that will hamper 
such efforts, and need to be carefully addressed before privatisation. The labour 
unions and political groups that are well-entrenched in its administrative structure, 
have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Furthermore, reforms in public 
sector performance need political consensus between the central and provincial 
levels of decision-making. A key obstacle is Pakistan’s ad hoc regulatory system and 
it’s deteriorating institutional environment, which creates incentives for misappro-
priation of resources. Any successful reform in heavy investment infrastructure 
sectors is dependent on the existence of institutions that protect such investments and 
engender respect for property rights. For instance, the successful privatisation of the 
electricity sector in countries like Chile occurred because market reform was 
preceded by major transformations of the regulatory and institutional environments. 
Significantly, there also existed in Chile a strong will for privatisation whereby 
ordinary public sector employees perceived themselves to have a positive stake 
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in reform. In Pakistan, such facilitating characteristics are not currently present in the 
public sector. Therefore, inefficiencies in electricity provision will not be mitigated 
through further investments in new facilities or by changing pricing policies, or even 
by implementing privatisation. 
 
2.  THE EXTENT AND INCIDENCE OF 
THE INEFFICIENCIES 
The survey was based on a pre-designed questionnaire of a stratified random 
sample of 150 manufacturing firms located in Karachi. Information on the 
population of firms was obtained from the provincial directory of industry prepared 
by the Sindh Chamber of Commerce, and information published by industrial trade 
associations. A low completion rate of 50 percent was due to Karachi’s law and 
order situation that impeded data collection. Therefore the analysis is based on those 
firms that successfully completed the questionnaire. Tables 1.1—1.8 show the 
general characteristics of the realised sample and the variations in the incidence of 
failures. The year chosen for analysis is 1997 and the firms are classified into 12 
industrial groups listed by employment size in Table 1. Results of the study are 
discussed below. 
The survey results reveal large variations in the availability and quality of 
publicly provided electricity and in the firms’ behaviour across all industrial sectors. 
These variations should be taken into account in government reforms for the 
electricity sector. Table 1.1 (Distribution of Manufacturing Firms by Area and 
Sources of Electricity), shows that only 17 out of the 73 firms or 23 percent do not 
have private electricity generators. This implies that the lack of reliable electricity 
supply is quite a serious problem in Karachi’s industrial sector. Table 1.2 
(Distribution of Manufacturing Firms: Sources of Electricity by Firm Size), shows 
that a significant number of captive firms are generally small in size, e.g., 1–49 
employees. Table 1.3 (Distribution of Power Outages by Firm Size), illustrates that 
small firms also are subject to a high number of power failures, although larger firms 
within the 200–499 employee category also suffer the bulk of outages. Interviews 
with the targeted 150 firms support the observation that small firms tend not to have 
private generating equipment. This occurs because small firms are unable to achieve 
economies of scale in private electricity generation. Table 1.1 also shows that there 
are no significant variations in the quality of public provision by industrial area, 
supporting the observation that inefficiencies are present in all the industrial areas of 
Karachi. 
Table 1.4 (Working Hours Lost Due to Power Outage by Firm Size), clearly 
shows that nearly 75 percent of the surveyed firms lost in excess of 100 working 
hours in 1997 due to power outage, and approximately 25 percent of these were 
small sized firms. Table 1.5 (Production Shut-down During Power Failure by Firm 
Size),  shows  that  nearly  50 percent  of  the  firms surveyed experienced production  
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Table 1 
Distribution of Manufacturing Firms by Industry and Employment Size 
Establishment Employment Size 
Industry 1–49 50–99 100–199 200–499 500–999 1000+ Total 
Food and 
Beverage 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(1) 
100.00 
3.85 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(1) 
100.00 
1.37 
Textile 
Products 
(1) 
7.14 
6.67 
(1) 
7.14 
16.67 
(1) 
7.14 
10.00 
(5) 
35.71 
19.23 
(3) 
21.43 
27.27 
(3) 
21.43 
60.00 
(14) 
100.00 
19.00 
Apparel and 
Other 
(4) 
36.36 
26.67 
(1) 
9.09 
16.67 
(2) 
18.18 
20.00 
(2) 
18.18 
7.69 
(2) 
18.18 
18.18 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(11) 
100.00 
15.07 
Furniture and 
Fixtures 
(3) 
100.00 
20.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(3) 
100.00 
4.11 
Chemical and 
Pharma 
(5) 
27.78 
33.33 
(1) 
5.56 
16.67 
(4) 
22.22 
40.00 
(5) 
27.78 
19.23 
(3) 
16.67 
27.27 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(18) 
100.00 
24.66 
Petroleum and 
Coal 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(1) 
33.33 
16.67 
(1) 
33.33 
10.00 
(1) 
33.33 
3.85 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(3) 
100.00 
4.11 
Leather and 
Other 
(1) 
25.00 
6.67 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(3) 
75.00 
11.54 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(4) 
100.00 
5.48 
Fabricated 
Metal 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(1) 
33.33 
10.00 
(1) 
33.33 
3.85 
(1) 
33.33 
9.09 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(3) 
100.00 
4.11 
Industrial 
Machinery 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(1) 
25.00 
10.00 
(2) 
50.00 
7.69 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(1) 
25.00 
20.00 
(4) 
100.00 
5.48 
Electrical 
Products 
(1) 
16.67 
6.67 
(1) 
16.67 
16.67 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(4) 
66.67 
15.38 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(6) 
100.00 
8.22 
Transport 
Equipment 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(2) 
66.67 
18.18 
(1) 
33.33 
20.00 
(3) 
100.00 
4.11 
Other (0) 
.00 
.00 
(1) 
33.33 
33.33 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(2) 
66.67 
7.69 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(3) 
100.00 
4.11 
Total (15) 
20.55 
100.00 
(6) 
8.22 
100.00 
(10) 
13.70 
100.00 
(26) 
35.62 
100.00 
(11) 
15.07 
100.00 
(5) 
6.85 
100.00 
(73) 
100.00 
100.00 
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Table 1.1 
Distribution of Manufacturing Firms by Area and Sources of Electricity** 
Sources of Electricity for Production Industrial 
Area KESC Only KESC Main OWN Main OWN Only Total 
Site (3) 
9.68 
17.65 
(23) 
74.19 
54.76 
(4) 
12.90 
57.14 
(1) 
3.23 
14.29 
(31) 
100.00 
42.47 
Korangi (5) 
26.32 
29.41 
(11) 
57.89 
26.19 
(1) 
5.26 
14.29 
(2) 
10.53 
28.57 
(19) 
100.00 
26.03 
Federal B (4) 
80.00 
23.53 
(1) 
20.00 
2.38 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(5) 
100.00 
6.85 
Landhi (3) 
23.08 
17.65 
(6) 
46.15 
14.29 
(1) 
7.69 
14.29 
(3) 
23.08 
42.86 
(13) 
100.00 
17.81 
West Wharf (2) 
40.00 
11.76 
(1) 
20.00 
2.38 
(1) 
20.00 
14.29 
(1) 
20.00 
14.29 
(5) 
100.00 
6.85 
Total (17) 
23.29 
100.00 
(42) 
57.53 
100.00 
(7) 
9.59 
100.00 
(7) 
9.59 
100.00 
(73) 
100.00 
100.00 
**KESC Only = Firm uses electricity 100 percent from KESC supply. 
**KESC Main = Firm uses KESC as main source of electricity supply and private generators as standby. 
**OWN Main  = Firm uses KESC supply as standby. 
**OWN Only  = Firm uses electricity supply 100 percent from private generators. 
 
Table 1.2 
Distribution of Manufacturing Firms: Sources of Electricity by Firm Size 
Establishment Employment Size Electricity 
Sources 1–49 50–99 100–199 200–499 500–999 1000+ Total 
KESC Only (7) 
41.18 
46.67 
(1) 
5.88 
16.67 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(6) 
35.29 
23.08 
(3) 
17.65 
27.27 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(17) 
100.00 
23.29 
KESC Main (6) 
14.29 
40.00 
(3) 
7.14 
50.00 
(10) 
23.81 
100.00 
(16) 
38.10 
61.54 
(5) 
11.90 
45.45 
(2) 
4.76 
40.00 
(42) 
100.00 
57.53 
OWN Main (1) 
14.29 
5.57 
(2) 
28.57 
33.33 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(2) 
28.57 
7.69 
(2) 
28.57 
18.18 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(7) 
100.00 
9.59 
OWN Only (1) 
14.29 
6.67 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(2) 
28.57 
7.69 
(1) 
14.29 
9.09 
(3) 
2.86 
60.00 
(7) 
100.00 
9.59 
Total (15) 
20.55 
100.00 
(6) 
8.22 
100.00 
(10) 
13.70 
100.00 
(26) 
35.62 
100.00 
(11) 
15.07 
100.00 
(5) 
.85 
100.00 
(73) 
100.00 
100.00 
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Table 1.3 
Distribution of Manufacturing Firms: Power Outages by 
Firm Size (Per Week in 1997) 
Establishment Employment Size Power 
Outage Times 1–49 50–99 100–199 200–499 500–999 1000+ Total 
0–10 
Per/Week 
(3) 
12.50 
20.00 
(2) 
8.33 
33.33 
(2) 
8.33 
20.00 
(9) 
37.50 
34.62 
(4) 
16.67 
36.36 
(4) 
16.67 
80.00 
(24) 
100.00 
32.88 
10–20 
Per/Week 
(10) 
14.29 
13.33 
(1) 
7.14 
16.67 
(2) 
14.29 
20.00 
(4) 
28.57 
15.38 
(4) 
28.57 
36.36 
(1) 
7.14 
20.00 
(14) 
100.00 
19.18 
20–HI 
Per/Week 
(10) 
28.57 
66.67 
(3) 
8.57 
50.00 
(6) 
17.14 
60.00 
(13) 
37.14 
50.00 
(3) 
8.57 
27.27 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(35) 
100.00 
47.95 
Total (15) 
20.55 
100.00 
(6) 
8.22 
100.00 
(10) 
13.70 
100.00 
(26) 
35.62 
100.00 
(11) 
15.07 
100.00 
(5) 
6.85 
100.00 
(73) 
100.00 
100.00 
 
Table 1.4 
Working Hours Lost Due to Power Outage by Firm Size 
Establishment Employment Size Hours Lost in 
1997 1–49 50–99 100–199 200–499 500–999 1000+ Total 
Zero Hours (3) 
17.65 
20.00 
(1) 
5.88 
16.67 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(6) 
35.29 
23.08 
(4) 
23.53 
36.36 
(3) 
17.65 
60.00 
(17) 
100.00 
23.29 
100–199 Hours (1) 
12.50 
6.67 
(2) 
25.00 
33.33 
(2) 
25.00 
20.00 
(3) 
37.50 
11.54 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(8) 
100.00 
10.96 
200–499 Hours (5) 
26.32 
33.33 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(2) 
10.53 
20.00 
(9) 
47.37 
34.62 
(2) 
10.53 
18.18 
(1) 
5.26 
20.00 
(19) 
100.00 
26.03 
500–999 Hours (2) 
40.00 
13.33 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(2) 
40.00 
7.69 
(1) 
20.00 
9.09 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(5) 
100.00 
6.85 
1000+ Hours (4) 
16.67 
26.67 
(3) 
12.50 
50.00 
(6) 
25.00 
60.00 
(6) 
25.00 
23.08 
(4) 
16.67 
36.36 
(1) 
4.17 
20.00 
(24) 
100.00 
32.88 
Total (15) 
20.55 
100.00 
(6) 
8.22 
100.00 
(10) 
13.70 
100.00 
(26) 
35.62 
100.00 
(11) 
15.07 
100.00 
(5) 
6.85 
100.00 
(73) 
100.00 
100.00 
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Table 1.5 
Production Shut-down During Power Failure by Firm Size 
Establishment Employment Size Hours Lost in 
1997 1–49 50–99 100–199 200–499 500–999 1000+ Total 
Zero Hours (3) 
17.65 
20.00 
(1) 
5.88 
16.67 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(6) 
35.29 
23.08 
(4) 
23.53 
36.36 
(3) 
17.65 
60.00 
(17) 
100.00 
23.29 
100–199 Hours (1) 
12.50 
6.67 
(2) 
25.00 
33.33 
(2) 
25.00 
20.00 
(3) 
37.50 
11.54 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(8) 
100.00 
10.96 
200–499 Hours (5) 
26.32 
33.33 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(2) 
10.53 
20.00 
(9) 
47.37 
34.62 
(2) 
10.53 
18.18 
(1) 
5.26 
20.00 
(19) 
100.00 
26.03 
500–999 Hours (2) 
40.00 
13.33 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(2) 
40.00 
7.69 
(1) 
20.00 
9.09 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(5) 
100.00 
6.85 
1000+ Hours (4) 
16.67 
26.67 
(3) 
12.50 
50.00 
(6) 
25.00 
60.00 
(6) 
25.00 
23.08 
(4) 
16.67 
36.36 
(1) 
4.17 
20.00 
(24) 
100.00 
32.88 
Total (15) 
20.55 
100.00 
(6) 
8.22 
100.00 
(10) 
13.70 
100.00 
(26) 
35.62 
100.00 
(11) 
15.07 
100.00 
(5) 
6.85 
100.00 
(73) 
100.00 
100.00 
 
shut-down during periods of power failure. Table 1.6 (Damage to Machinery and 
Equipment Due to Power Failure), shows that approximately 43 percent of the firms 
reported damage to their machinery and equipment and that 20 percent of these were 
small sized establishments. In Table 1.7 (Damage to Raw Materials Due to Power 
Loss by Firm Size), it is observed that 38 percent of the firms experienced damage to 
raw materials due to power failures.  Of these 32 percent were small sized firms. 
Finally, Table 1.8 (Perceived Business Prospects by Firm Size), shows the firms’ 
evaluation of their ‘business prospects’ and of those that reported declining 
prospects, 45 percent were firms with less than 50 employees. The electricity 
problem was cited as one of the critical factors contributing to the growth difficulties 
of most of the firms. 
From Tables 1.2 through 1.7 it can be observed that small firms generally 
carry a higher burden of power supply failures. This has an important implication for 
the growth of industries and the generation of employment in urban areas of 
developing countries like Pakistan. Studies on regional patterns of industrial location 
in Bogota [Lee (1989)] and Seoul [Lee (1985)], show that small new firms tend to 
spend their early years near an urban centre where essential infrastructure services 
are easily accessed. The firms follow this pattern as it is expensive for them to 
operate independently in outlying areas where such infrastructure is unavailable. The 
studies show that these urban areas serve an ‘incubator function’ for small new firms 
which, as they  become more independent,  move out of the central area in search of more  
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Table 1.6 
Damage to Machinery and Equipment Due to Power Failure 
Establishment Employment Size Hours Lost in 
1997 1–49 50–99 100–199 200–499 500–999 1000+ Total 
Zero Hours (3) 
17.65 
20.00 
(1) 
5.88 
16.67 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(6) 
35.29 
23.08 
(4) 
23.53 
36.36 
(3) 
17.65 
60.00 
(17) 
100.00 
23.29 
100–199 Hours (1) 
12.50 
6.67 
(2) 
25.00 
33.33 
(2) 
25.00 
20.00 
(3) 
37.50 
11.54 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(8) 
100.00 
10.96 
200–499 Hours (5) 
26.32 
33.33 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(2) 
10.53 
20.00 
(9) 
47.37 
34.62 
(2) 
10.53 
18.18 
(1) 
5.26 
20.00 
(19) 
100.00 
26.03 
500–999 Hours (2) 
40.00 
13.33 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(2) 
40.00 
7.69 
(1) 
20.00 
9.09 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(5) 
100.00 
6.85 
1000+ Hours (4) 
16.67 
26.67 
(3) 
12.50 
50.00 
(6) 
25.00 
60.00 
(6) 
25.00 
23.08 
(4) 
16.67 
36.36 
(1) 
4.17 
20.00 
(24) 
100.00 
32.88 
Total (15) 
20.55 
100.00 
(6) 
8.22 
100.00 
(10) 
13.70 
100.00 
(26) 
35.62 
100.00 
(11) 
15.07 
100.00 
(5) 
6.85 
100.00 
(73) 
100.00 
100.00 
 
Table 1.7 
Damage to Raw Materials Due to Power Loss by Firm Size 
Establishment Employment Size Hours Lost in 
1997 1–49 50–99 100–199 200–499 500–999 1000+ Total 
Zero Hours (3) 
17.65 
20.00 
(1) 
5.88 
16.67 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(6) 
35.29 
23.08 
(4) 
23.53 
36.36 
(3) 
17.65 
60.00 
(17) 
100.00 
23.29 
100–199 Hours (1) 
12.50 
6.67 
(2) 
25.00 
33.33 
(2) 
25.00 
20.00 
(3) 
37.50 
11.54 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(8) 
100.00 
10.96 
200–499 Hours (5) 
26.32 
33.33 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(2) 
10.53 
20.00 
(9) 
47.37 
34.62 
(2) 
10.53 
18.18 
(1) 
5.26 
20.00 
(19) 
100.00 
26.03 
500–999 Hours (2) 
40.00 
13.33 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(2) 
40.00 
7.69 
(1) 
20.00 
9.09 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(5) 
100.00 
6.85 
1000+ Hours (4) 
16.67 
26.67 
(3) 
12.50 
50.00 
(6) 
25.00 
60.00 
(6) 
25.00 
23.08 
(4) 
16.67 
36.36 
(1) 
4.17 
20.00 
(24) 
100.00 
32.88 
Total (15) 
20.55 
100.00 
(6) 
8.22 
100.00 
(10) 
13.70 
100.00 
(26) 
35.62 
100.00 
(11) 
15.07 
100.00 
(5) 
6.85 
100.00 
(73) 
100.00 
100.00 
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Table 1.8 
Perceived Business Prospects by Firm Size 
Establishment Employment Size Business 
Prospects 1–49 50–99 100–199 200–499 500–999 1000+ Total 
Rapidly 
Expanding 
(2) 
16.67 
13.33 
(1) 
8.33 
16.67 
(2) 
16.67 
20.00 
(4) 
33.33 
15.38 
(1) 
8.33 
9.09 
(2) 
16.67 
40.00 
(12) 
100.00 
16.44 
Expanding 
Somewhat 
(4) 
10.00 
26.67 
(5) 
12.50 
83.33 
(4) 
10.00 
40.00 
(16) 
40.00 
61.54 
(8) 
20.00 
72.73 
(3) 
7.50 
60.00 
(40) 
100.00 
54.79 
No Change (4) 
40.00 
26.67 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(6) 
60.00 
23.08 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(10) 
100.00 
13.70 
Declining (5) 
45.45 
33.33 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(4) 
36.36 
40.00 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(2) 
18.18 
18.18 
(0) 
.00 
.00 
(11) 
100.00 
15.07 
Total (15) 
20.55 
100.00 
(6) 
8.22 
100.00 
(10) 
13.70 
100.00 
(26) 
35.62 
100.00 
(11) 
15.07 
100.00 
(5) 
6.85 
100.00 
(73) 
100.00 
100.00 
 
space. The research results suggest that large cities like Karachi with poor 
infrastructure offer limited incubation opportunity to small new firms that have 
difficulty in setting up private power generation or other essential services. The 
burdens therefore of inadequate public provision are especially severe for fledgling 
firms, which may start and grow in megacities like Karachi. This negative impact on 
the birth and growth of small firms will inhibit the generation of employment and 
income in megacities like Karachi. For example, the Bogota and Seoul studies also 
reveal that small firms generate 60 percent to 80 percent of the new job 
opportunities. This implies high returns of improved electricity service in specific 
areas where service reliability problems are user specific. 
Future research could include samples of firms located in secondary cities 
such as Sialkot and Faisalabad. The comparison of the quality of infrastructure 
services between these cities and primate cities like Karachi would indicate the 
incubator function available for small firms in secondary cities. World Bank research 
[Anas et al. (1996)] on cities in Thailand and Indonesia concluded that inefficiencies 
in public power provision tend to be higher in secondary cities where the burdens on 
small firms are also greater. 
 
3.  THE FIRMS’ RESPONSES TO THE INEFFICIENCIES 
As shown in Table 1.1, the firms’ responses are classified into four categories 
according to the sources of their power: (i) “KESC only” are captive firms that 
purchase all their electricity from KESC and therefore have no private investments to 
generate their own power; (ii) “KESC main” or stand-by firms rely on KESC but 
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switch to their own generators during periods of breakdown in public supply; (iii) 
“OWN main” are those firms with the public supply as stand-by that normally use 
their own generators to ensure an adequate power supply, but switch to KESC during 
periods when the reliability of public power is considered high; and finally, (iv) 
“OWN only” are self-sufficient firms that have disconnected from the public grid. 
In empirical studies [Anas and Lee (1989) and Anas et al. (1996)] on 
restructuring industrial organisation policy to facilitate infrastructure reform, it was 
observed that manufacturing firms used four ways to respond to inefficiencies in 
public electricity provision. Each response had its own economic rationale. The 
responses were (1) relocation, (2) factor substitution, (3) private provision, and (4) 
output reduction. In the interest of brevity, the third category, that was widely 
observed to occur in Karachi, is discussed. Within this category, four types of 
strategies are identified namely: 
 (a) Self-sufficiency: The firm provides its own electricity service to the point 
where there is no need for the public source. This strategy was observed 
mostly amongst large textile and garment manufacturers as well as 
multinational companies. Nearly all multinationals in the survey were self-
sufficient in electricity provision. From Table 1.1, it can be gleaned that only 
10 percent of the firms apply this strategy in electricity provision. 
 (b) Standby Private Provision: The firm has installed private generators and 
switches to these only when the reliability of KESC supply falls below a 
certain level. Table 1.1 shows that approximately 58 percent of the firms 
surveyed used this strategy as it appears to be the most popular mode of 
private provision across all firms and sectors. 
 (c) Public Source as Standby:  The firm relies on private facility but switches to 
the KESC supply during those times of day when the public source is highly 
reliable. Again, from Table 1.1 it can be gleaned that nearly 10 percent of 
the surveyed firms reported such behaviour as public supply is not reliable. 
 (d) Captivity:  The firm relies on KESC’s network exclusively despite the very 
low reliability of service. This is the dominant strategy amongst small sized 
firms who cannot afford electricity generators. Nearly 24 percent of firms 
reported such behaviour with almost 41 percent being small sized firms. 
The studies (1989, 1996) also suggest that there are economic incentives for 
three additional types of private provision regimes. These regimes are briefly 
discussed but they were not widely observed in Karachi because of extensive 
government restrictions on electricity trading between private firms. These regimes 
are (1) joint production, (2) satellite behaviour, and (3) shared production. 
Joint production occurs when large firms invest substantially in private 
generation facilities and profit from selling part of the surplus output to neighbouring 
firms. Satellite behaviour is the opposite side of joint production and applies to those 
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firms that buy electricity from other firms that produce surplus quantities. When a 
power interruption occurs, a satellite firm switches from the public source to the 
supply source of the nearby private producer. 
The survey observed two cases of satellite behaviour, one in the garment and 
the second in the textile manufacturing sectors. In each case, a firm was buying 
surplus power from a neighbouring larger firm and the purchase was based on a 
contractually agreed price for fixed quantities of daily supply. In both cases, 
electricity was being traded without government approval. The manufacturers 
explained that it was too complicated to obtain a licence under the present regulatory 
system. The present regulatory framework is very stringent on electricity trading, 
which can take place only between private firms and public utilities and not between 
private firms themselves. Logic suggests that additional cases of satellite behaviour 
exist in Karachi because of the economic incentives involved in such a regime of 
private provision. 
Finally, shared production concerns instances where several firms come 
together to form ‘utility pools’ or cartels to share the capital cost of private electricity 
generation by building facilities in industrial estates. There is anecdotal evidence of 
such behaviour in specific industrial sectors, such as textiles and chemicals in Lahore 
and Faisalabad, but such evidence was lacking in the sample survey for Karachi. 
 
4.  THE CAPITAL COSTS OF PRIVATE PROVISION AND 
WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR RELIABILITY 
The survey provides an illuminating study of the incidence of private 
provision, which is clearly the dominant response among Karachi’s manufacturing 
firms. The survey yields important information concerning the average current 
market values of electric equipment and facilities used for private provision, and 
their share in the total value of the firms’ machinery and equipment. The findings 
show that the average current market value of private power generation equipment 
for all firms is approximately Rs 10.7 billion which represents 11 percent of the total 
value of the firms’ machinery and equipment. Furthermore, private power as an input 
has a 5 percent share of the variable cost of all inputs. The findings also reveal that 
nearly all firms in the stand-by regime have installed generation capacity sufficient 
to power an entire plant if KESC supply fails. In the stand-by firms approximately 37 
percent of total power used during 1997 came from private generators and the 
remaining from KESC. If the typical installed private generator is sufficient to run an 
entire plant, then nearly 63 percent of the generation capacity of private generators 
remains idle or is under utilised. This idle capacity yields high total average cost of 
private power generation, especially when the costs of under utilisation and 100 
percent utilisation are compared. The high cost of private provision sustained by 
these firms is the implicit value of service reliability that firms are willing to pay for. 
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‘Willingness to pay’ is determined by calculating the average cost (per kWh) of 
electricity produced by the firms’ private generators at the under utilised rate. The 
conclusion is that when the average cost of private provision is greater than the 
KESC price, the difference between these two prices yields the premium firms are 
willing to incur for reliable power supply. 
In order to determine the average cost of private power generation, two sets of 
calculations are made by using the firms’ reported power consumption from 
generators during 1997. In the first calculation, under utilisation reflects the cost of 
holding idle generating capacity, and in the second full utilisation assumes 100 
percent generation from private source. The capital recovery cost is computed by 
annualising the current market value of the generators and accessories using the 
remaining service life. The recurring costs of fuel, labour and maintenance are added 
to the capital cost, and are duly adjusted to make pertinent calculations for the full 
utilisation case. Based on the actual average utilisation rate of 37 percent, the 
average cost per kWh is calculated as Rs 6.00, almost twice the present KESC tariff. 
Notably, under the 100 percent utilisation scenario the average cost per kWh falls 
substantially to Rs 2.00. 
In Table 2, the average fixed and variable costs of private power provision are 
calculated by size of firm. Small sized firms (1–49) show an average cost that is 
slightly lower than the sample mean. This is not because they are able to generate 
electric power at a lower cost, but because they cannot afford to make the expensive 
capital investment required for self-sufficiency. This group may be able to generate 
enough private power to support small-scale lighting and other basic infrastructure. 
Table 2.1 shows the premium for reliability for various representative scales of 
power production based on under utilisation. The unit premium is nearly twice over 
the public price for firms producing 100,000 to 2.5 million kWh, declines for firms 
producing 5 million kWh annually, and virtually disappears for those producing 25 
million or more kWh annually. This suggests that small users of electricity pay a 
much higher premium than large users. This further implies that if KESC improved 
its power reliability, it would yield greater savings to small firms than large ones. 
In Table 2.2, a simple regression estimation is applied to calculate the cost 
function for various levels of private electricity production at 100 percent generation 
capacity. The scale of production is measured by the quantity of electricity (kWh) 
privately produced. To measure this, the annual cost of generation is computed. The 
annual cost has two components, (1) annualised fixed cost and (2) annualised 
variable cost, and the sum of (1) and (2) yields the annual total cost. The results 
show that the unit price paid declines with the quantity produced reflecting quantity 
discounts. Average cost functions are assumed to be negative exponential curves as 
they are expected to confirm the presence of strong economies of scale in private 
electricity production. The form of the negative exponential curve is the following: 
(Average Cost) ¡ =A exp ( –a Q) e ¡ … … … (1) 
Nausheen H. Anwar 180
Table 2 
Average Fixed and Variable Costs of Private Power 
Generation per kWh by Size of Firm 
Firm Size Fixed Cost* Variable Cost** Total 
All Firms (Rs) 
   (Percent) 
 
3.2 
 
3.1 
 
6.3 
      1–49 2.8 2.2 5.1 
    50–99 0.8 1.2 2.0 
100–199 4.3 3.4 7.8 
200–499 2.6 3.5 6.1 
500–999 3.5 2.4 5.9 
1000 and Over 1.0 2.1 2.8 
Note:  For the sample firms as a whole, 37 percent of electric power supply came from private generators. 
 * Annualised capital value of generators and accessories. 
 ** Includes fuel, maintenance, parts, and labour. 
 
 
Table 2.1 
Public and Private Unit Prices and Estimated Reliability  
Premia for Various Levels of Electricity Production 
        Q 
(1,000 kWh) 
Public 
(Rs/kWh) 
Private 
(Rs/kWh) 
Premium for 
Reliability 
100 4.99 9.68 1.94 
1,000 4.60 7.08 1.53 
2,500 4.52 5.60 1.23 
5,000 3.93 4.01 1.02 
10,000 3.01 2.67 0.88 
25,000 2.67 1.90 0.71 
30,000 2.00 1.00 0.50 
Sources:  Estimated Private Cost Function and Estimated KESC Tariff. Based on under utilisation. 
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Table 2.2 
Private Power Generation Cost Functions for Various Levels of Electricity 
Production (Fixed, Variable and Total Costs) 
        Q 
(1,000 kWh) 
Variable Cost 
(Rs/kWh) 
Fixed Cost 
(Rs/kWh) 
Total Cost 
(Rs/kWh) 
50 3.81 4.19 8.26 
100 2.87 2.36 5.84 
500 1.49 0.62 2.61 
1,000 1.12 0.39 1.85 
1,500 0.95 0.25 1.51 
2,500 0.77 0.16 1.17 
3,500 0.67 0.12 0.99 
5,000 0.58 0.09 0.82 
10,000 0.44 0.05 0.58 
20,000 0.33 0.03 0.41 
25,000 0.30 0.02 0.37 
30,000 0.28 0.02 0.34 
Sources: Estimated Private Cost Functions for Fixed, Variable and Total Costs based on 100 percent 
generation. 
 
where ¡ denotes the ith firm in the sample. A is a constant for the sample and e is the 
multiplicative disturbance term of the average  cost  function, which varies from firm 
to firm in the sample of i = 1….56 firms which had generators. Therefore, the 
expectation is that E (e ¡) = 1. This cost function is linearised by taking the natural 
logarithm of both sides. Then, 
ln [(Average Cost) ¡] = ln A –a Q + ln e ¡ … … … (2) 
The linearised equation is estimated as a linear regression with the left side as the 
dependent variable, ln A as the intercept, –a as the slope and ln e ¡ as a normal 
disturbance with E [ln e ¡] = 0. This assumption on ln e ¡ implies that E {e ¡} = exp 
(s2 / 2), where s is the standard error of the estimated regression. Then the average 
cost over the sample is: 
(Average Cost) = [ A exp (s2 / 2)] exp ( –a Q) … … … (3) 
The procedure is implemented three times, first for AFC, then for AVC, and 
finally for ATC. In each case the slopes are statistically significant, with the slope 
coefficient of the AATC function as –.05 and intercept as 4.07. The cost functions 
are transformed to the exponential form given by (3) and are plotted in Figure 1. A 
convenient way to evaluate the above cost functions is to use them to measure the 
‘output elasticity of average cost’. This elasticity is the percent decline in average 
cost (Rs/kWh)  due  to  a one  percent increase in the quantity of electricity produced  
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privately. The elasticity is –a Q. In the sample, the average quantity of electricity 
privately produced is approximately 4,233,000 kWh per year. This number is used to 
evaluate the elasticity at the mean which shows that a 1 percent increase in private 
output results in a 0.05 percent reduction in the average cost of electricity. Since the 
elasticity increases linearly with level of electricity privately produced, the cost 
saving is greater for larger productions. For instance, in the sample, the mean 
quantity of electricity produced by the five largest producers is 219,360,600 kWh, or 
50.82 times the mean quantity. The mean per unit cost for this sub-sample is Rs 6.19 
p/kWh rendering its elasticity to (50.82/6.19) 8.2. The five largest firms therefore 
will realise an 8 percent saving in average cost by producing one percent more 
electricity. The conclusion: the more intensive a user of electricity, the stronger the 
incentive to produce larger quantity and to act as a joint producer of electricity. 
There are benefits in encouraging large manufacturers to contest KESC’s monopoly 
as a producer and supplier of electricity to the industrial sector. 
 
5.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPROVING ELECTRICITY 
PROVISION TO THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
As discussed earlier, electricity provision in Pakistan suffers from two 
extreme cases of inefficiency: (a) a non-performing public sector with large capital 
investments, and (b) costly provision of the service by manufacturing firms. The 
private provision response observed in Karachi has developed over the decades due 
to chronic public sector failure. If this response had not emerged, the resulting 
welfare losses to society could have been much higher than they are today. 
The current political-economic environment in Pakistan suggests that reforms 
in public sector performance will emerge gradually and be accompanied by major 
adjustments in pricing policy favouring higher tariffs. Although necessary for 
promoting allocative efficiency, the price changes will create burdens for industrial 
end-users. Hence the challenge is to identify intermediate policy options that can be 
easily implemented to bridge the gap between the two extreme inefficiencies and 
thus mitigate the burden on industrial users. The study suggests two intermediate 
policy options: (1) change the regulatory structure in Pakistan inducing greater 
utilisation of private provision capacities, especially in urban-industrial locations like 
Karachi; and (2) encourage greater private sector participation in the supply of 
electricity service to end-users. 
Firstly, basic changes in the regulatory structure could benefit private firms. 
The current regulatory environment discourages the emergence of regimes such as 
joint production and shared production, which have been discussed earlier. If large 
firms with underutilised capacities are allowed to exploit economies of scale and 
compete with utilities like KESC, significant benefits can accrue to the industrial 
sector. KESC could raise upward its tariff rate for industrial users as they will have 
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the choice to switch to private suppliers. Regulatory change will also encourage the 
establishment of ‘utility pools’ whereby firms could join hands to exploit economies 
of scale in the provision of electricity. The ‘captive firms’, which are mostly small 
ones, will realise benefits by joining the pool to become satellite firms for larger 
ones. 
Secondly, the study suggests an industrial organisation policy that sets 
limits on protecting the public monopolies. Presently, the government in Pakistan 
(a) supports WAPDA and KESC as the only suppliers of power to end-users; (b) 
does not allow other private companies to enter the market for directly selling 
power to end-users; (c) levies a tax on imported power generators, and though 
firms are allowed to install their own generators, they can do so only by obtaining 
government approval; and (d) inter-firm power trading is restricted. Clearly the 
current policy toward encouraging competition in the electricity market is highly 
inefficient. It follows that by applying appropriate industrial organisation 
frameworks in the power sector, gains in economic efficiency and equity will be 
realised. For instance, recent literature [Mody (1996); Newbury (1995); Anas and 
Lee (1989)] re-examines competitive markets by arguing that an economic activity 
can be ‘unbundled’ into separate functions to enhance efficiency. For instance, 
functions that are subject to high sunk costs and scale economies, i.e., transmission 
and distribution, can remain in the public sector’s hands. Those functions that are 
traditionally characterised by low entry costs, like power generation, can be made 
into a competitive industry. A fundamental policy aim in Pakistan’s power 
generation should be to allow for a variety of market arrangements to emerge 
(utility pools, cartels) by liberalising the production, buying and selling of power 
among various users. This will induce large firms to utilise idle generating 
capacity by selling it to neighbouring firms and perhaps even to KESC, whose 
generation capacity has fallen short of increasing demand. 
The most positive result of enhancing competition in the electricity market in 
megacities like Karachi will be that end-users have multiple sources for buying 
power. Consequently, the demand for public power, which is poor in quality and 
quantity, will diminish. Such policies are a simple but efficient way of dealing with 
the allocation of core infrastructure goods like electricity, which is critical for the 
productivity of a developing nation like Pakistan where the current discourse on 
public policy had better examine these options before implementing radical measures 
like outright privatisation. 
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